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1. INTRODUCTION
The first conception of a legal right to own one's intellectual
works stemmed from the invention of printing.' Several hundred
years later, in 1708, Great Britain enacted the world's first formal
copyright law. Thus, copyright and, consequently, copyright
laws are not novel concepts in modern society's endeavor to
protect intellectual undertakings from unauthorized use.
Formal copyright law initially appeared in China during the
early twentieth century. The Copyright Law of the Great Qing,
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 1992,
University of Colorado. This Comment is dedicated to my mom and dad,
Roberta and Jay Kolton, for their love, support, and inspiration. Special thanks
to Jacques deLisle and Kathy Rollins for their helpful insights and suggestions.
' See Guy Yonay, Book Note, 8 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 537, 538 (1995)
(reviewing WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995)); see also
Edward G. Durney, Copyright Law in China and Taiwan, in GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERIES 1993: PROTECTING TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES, at 1 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 367, 1993) (noting that
as early as the year 1068, some form of protection against the unauthorized
printing of books existed in China).
2 See Statute of Queen Anne, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.); Foreign
Companies Recognize, Employ China's Copyright Law (Beijing China Radio
International radio broadcast, May 4, 1994), microformed on FBIS-CHI-94-089,
at 35 (Foreign Broadcast Info. Serv.).
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adopted by the Government of the Qing Dynasty in 1910 ("1910
Law"), was the first formal copyright law instituted in China.
The 1910 Law, which protected "works of literature and art,
pamphlets, calligraphy, photographs, sculptures[,] and models,"4
did not last long. The Qing Government was overthrown just
two years after the 1910 Law's inception.'
The Northern Warlord implemented a second copyright law
in China in 1915.6 Subsequently, in 1928, the Guomingdang
Government instituted a new copyright law, which remained in
effect until China's Communist Revolution in 1949.' These two
copyright laws were only slight revisions of the original 1910
Law.'
Beginning in the 1950s, the Communist government of the
People's Republic of China ("PRC" or "China") established
various laws and regulations that purported to protect copyright-
like rights in certain instances, and remunerated writers and artists
for their efforts.9 Still, after almost thirty years following the
Communist Revolution, the PRC lacked a coherent and compre-
hensive legal system for intellectual property protection. 0
Moreover, during the period between 1966 and 1976, commonly
known as the Cultural Revolution, the PRC suspended the then-
existing protective regulations and the concomitant compensation
for innovators."
The late 1970s, coinciding with the end of Chairman Mao
Zedong's regime, brought the advent of the PRC's "Four
Modernizations" policy of economic and technological develop-
ment.1 2 Copyright protection became an important mechanism
for encouraging creativity and ingenuity in China's push toward
3 See Song Muwen, Letter from China, 27 COPYRIGHT 43, 43 (1991).
4Id.
I See id. at 44.
6 See id.
7 See id.
' See id.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 45.
11 See id. at 44.
12 See id. at 44-45. See generally CHINA'S FOUR MODERNIZATIONS: THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (Richard Baum ed., 1980) (detailing the
Four Modernizations program established by post-Maoist China in order to
upgrade the PRC's economic and technological capabilities) [hereinafter FOUR
MODERNIZATIONS].
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modernization.13
In 1979, in order to modernize Chinese society, the PRC
began an official inquiry aimed at establishing a new, comprehen-
sive system of copyright legislation and protection. 14  After
thorough discussion, intensive research, and over twenty drafts
and revisions throughout the next decade,"5 the Fifteenth Session
of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's
Congress ("NPC") of China approved the first official Commu-
nist-era Copyright Law of the PRC 6 ("Copyright Law") on
September 7, 1990.17 The Implementing Regulations for the
Copyright Law of the PRC' ("Implementing Regulations") and
the Copyright Law itself became effective contemporaneously on
June 1, 1991.'9
Nevertheless, recent events, such as the Tiananmen Square
uprising, have raised concerns about the volatility of China's
political apparatus and its relationship with the West.20 As
recent trade disputes between the United States and China
illustrate, this relationship has become very fragile. The
13 See Muwen, supra note 3, at 44-45.
14 See id. The PRC became a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") in 1980. See Wang Aipin&, Intellectual Property Rights
Protection Viewed, FAZHI RIBAO ("Legality Daily"), Aug. 1, 1993, at 3,
microformed on FBIS-CHI-93-158, at 36 (Foreign Broadcast Info. Serv.)
(translating an interview with Cai Cheng, Vice Chairman of the National
People's Congress Standing Committee).
15 See Durney, supra note 1, at xx.
16 Any references to Chinese legal documents in this Comment refer to
English language translations of such documents, not their official Chinese
versions.
"' See Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in 27
COPYRIGHT, Copyright and Neighboring Rights Laws and Treaties (insert) at 2-01
(1991) [hereinafter Copyright Law]. This Copyright Law was strongly
influenced by the copyright legislation of other nations, such as the United
States and Japan, yet Article 1 retains a slight socialist bent, mentioning, for
example, the promotion of "socialist culture and sciences" and the "construction
of socialist spiritual and material civilization." Id. art. 1; see Durney, supra note
1, at 1.
" See Implementing Regulations for the Copyright Law of the People's
Republic of China, translated in E. ASIAN EXEcUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1991, at
22 [hereinafter Implementing Regulations].
19 See Jia Zhao, Implementing Regulations for Copyright Law, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1991, at 9, 9.
20 See Durney, supra note 1, at 2.
21 See discussion infra section 5.
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maintenance of the U.S.-Sino connection has profound implica-
tions on the enforcement of China's nascent legal system for
copyright protection.2
This Comment analyzes judicial enforcement of copyrights in
post-Maoist China. Section 2 reviews the current state of Chinese
copyright law, including the PRC's recent accession to various
international copyright protection conventions. Section 3 outlines
the existing judicial structures in China. Section 4 reviews several
copyright cases adjudicated prior to the implementation of the
1991 Copyright Law, details the logistics of bringing copyright
lawsuits in the People's Courts of the PRC, and discusses the
newly formed Intellectual Property Courts that constitute a
specialized section of, and gain their authority from, the People's
Courts. This section also explores recent copyright cases, both
' A short synopsis of current political developments is instructive,
although this issue generally is beyond the scope of this Comment. With the
impending death oflongtime Chinese ruler Deng Xiaoping - who, at the time
this Comment was written, was allegedly unable to stand on his own due to
illness - the future political climate in the PRC is very uncertain. See Rone
Tempest, Nightly News Has Clues to China's Likely Next Leader, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1995, at Al, A12 [hereinafter Tempest, Nightly News Has Clues].
Three high-level members of the PRC government, President Jiang Zemin,
Premier Li Peng, and National People's Congress Chairman Qiao Shi, all
appear to be possible successors to Deng. See id. at A12. Many political
scientists observe that it appears likely, at least at the beginning of the "post-
Deng era," that these three men may share power, with Jiang, Deng's chosen
successor, at the core. See id.
iang's future succession is far from certain, however, and he faces strong
challenges from other top government officials. See Taiwan's Ruling Party Sees
Power Struggle in China, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Feb. 9, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The favorite of Western governments is
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, who orchestrated many recent Chinese economic
reforms. Zhu, however, apparently has fallen out of favor within the
Communist Party as of late. See Tempest, Nightly News Has Clues, supra, at
A12.
This scenario does not bode well for the improvement of intellectual
property protection in China. Most of the recent gains in legislation and
enforcement can be traced back to Western pressure on the Chinese govern-
ment. Such pressure will probably carry less weight in a new, dispersed
Chinese power structure. Cf William Safire, Power to the People Doesn't Mean
Anarchy, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1995, at 27 (arguing thatpolitical power in China
after Deng's death "will probably devolve to centrifugalmen in a half-dozen
reions, thereby reflecting economic reality"). But see William Flannery, Who
W'ill Bend Most in China Talks?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1995, at 6C
(quoting Remi L. Wrona, an international trade consultant, who feels that
"[t]he shift of power has been basically settled; I don't think Deng's passing will
have that great an impact") [hereinafter Flannery, Who Will Bend Most].
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domestic and foreign, brought in the Intellectual Property Courts
and critiques their efficacy in light of those cases. Section 5
explores extrajudicial factors which are necessary for a more
effective copyright protection system in China.
2. THE CURRENT STATE OF COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION
IN THE PRC
The foundations of the PRC's domestic copyright protection
are the Copyright Law and its Implementing Regulations, which
protect a wide variety of copyrightable intellectual property. 
3
The Implementing Regulations clarify, and occasionally alter,
integral concepts used in the Copyright Law, and buttress the
Copyright Law's administrative and penalty requirements. 24
Computer software, while specifically enumerated and safeguarded
by the Copyright Law,' essentially is protected by a separate
piece of legislation entitled the Regulations on Computer Software
Protection of the People's Republic of China ("Software Regula-
tions").26  Additional elements of protection for computer
software in China are the Measures for the Registration of Copy-
The Copyright Law contains 56 articles divided into six chapters; the
Implementing Regulations also contains 56 articles, but is split into seven
chapters. Protected items include: "literary works, oral works, musical[,]
drainatic[,] and choregraphic [sic] works, works of fine art, photographic
works, cinematographic[,] television[,] and video works, product and engineer-
ing designs and their explanations, maps and schematic drawings, computer
programs, and other works as stipulated in laws and administative regulations."
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN ASIA S 3.25 (Arthur Wineburg ed.,
1992) [hereinafter PROTECTION IN ASIA]; see Copyright Law, supra note 17, art.
3. "Adaptations, translations, annotations[,] and collations o such protected
works also are protected." PROTECTION N ASIA S 3.25; see Copyright Law,
supra note 17, art. 10.
There is no registration requirement for copyright protection of most of
these works in the PRC. See Stephen Hayward, China: Practical Protection of
IP Rights, IP ASIA, June 30, 1994, at 2, 6. Registration is, mandated only for
computer software, and then merely "to facilitate proof not subsistence of
copyright." Michael D. Pendleton, Chinese Intellectual Property - Some Global
Implications for Legal Culture and National Sovereignty, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 119, 119 (1993).
24 See Zhao, supra note 19, at 9.
See Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 3(8).
26 See Regulations on Computer Software Protection of the People's
Republic of China, translated in Henry H. Liu, Legislative Update - Legal
Aspects of Software Protection in China: The Computer Software Protection
Regulations, 9 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, app. (1993) [hereinafter
Software Regulations].
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right in Computer Software, which were signed by the Chinese
Minister of the Machine-Building and Electronics Industry on
April 6, 1992.'
Despite the thoroughness and sophistication of these recent
copyright laws and regulations, they do not bring China's
copyright protection in line with the standards of the interna-
tional community, as represented by the Berne Convention2 and
the Universal Copyright Convention ("UCC").29 The Berne
Convention is a multinational accord designed both to create
reciprocal copyright protections among its member nations and to
secure minimum standards of copyright protection for nationals
of all such countries.3 ° The UCC exists under the auspices of
the United Nations and mandates a basic level of copyright
27 See Durney, supra note 1, at 4.
2 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Paris Act, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in ZHENG
CHENGSI & IVRCHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA app. 4
[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA].
29 See Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943
U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter IJCC].
30 The Berne Convention is presided over by the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") and it provides copyright protection to works
first published outside of the country where an auth or su sequently requests
his or her work be protected. See Berne Convention, supra note 28, art. 5,
para. 1. See generally Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (containing the
provisions establishing the WIPO). The Berne Convention is not intended to
supersede a member state's copyright laws; rather it is intended to supplement
these laws, thus ensuring. relative consistency in protection among member
states. See Berne Convention, supra note 28, art. 5, ara. 1. Protection and the
"means of redress" are governed "exclusively by te [copyright] laws of the
country There protection is claimed." Id. art. 5, para. 2. Article 5 of the Berne
Convention provides:
Protection in the country of origin [of a copyrighted work] is
governed by domestic law. However, when t.he author is not a
national of the country of origin of the work for which he is
protected under [the Berne] Convention, he shall enjoy in that country
the same rights as national authors.
Id. art. 5, para. 3.
Additionally, the Berne Convention stipulates that "[tlhe enjoyment and
the exercise of [the above-mentioned] rights [are not] subject to any formality,"
imposing no strict formal requirements for protection. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
In 1989, the United States acceded to the Berne Convention and amended
its laws accordingly to conform to international standards. See Paul B. Birden,
Jr., Technology 7ransfers to China: An Outline of Chinese Law, 16 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 413, 419 (1994).
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protection for citizens of countries who are parties to the
agreement in any other state which is also a party to the UCC.31
In 1991, the United States pressured the PRC to improve its
intellectual property protections with threats of trade sanctions
pursuant to the "Special 301" section of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,32 and in the eleventh hour China
capitulated.33  The resulting U.S.-Sino Memorandum of Under-
standing ("MOU") on intellectual property issues was signed
January 17, 1992, and became effective two months later.34 This
bilateral MOU created reciprocal copyright protection between
the United States and China and also stipulated that the PRC
accede to prevailing international copyright standards. 35  Pursu-
ant to the MOU, China joined the Berne Convention on October
15, 1992, and the UCC on October 30, 1992.36 China effected
its accession to the Berne Convention through the Implementing
International Copyright Treaties Provisions ("Treaties Provisions").sY
31 See UCC, supra note 29, 25 U.S.T. at 1345, 943 U.N.T.S. at 195.
32 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
1303(b), 102 Stat. 1179 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
3 See Executive Briefing: U.S.-China Intellectual Property Agreement, E.
ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Jan. 15, 1992, at 4, 4; Joseph T. Simone, Jr., Improving
Protection of Intellectual Property, CHINA Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 9, 9
[hereinafter Simone, Improving Protection]. See generally HARRY HARDING, A
FRAGILE RELATIONSHIP: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA SINCE 1972 (1992)
(discussing U.S.-Sino relations since President Nixon's visit to the PRC on
February 17, 1972).
3 See Simone, Improving Protection, supra note 33, at 9.
35 See id.
36 See Implementing International Copyright Treaties Provisions, translated
in CHINA L. & PRAC., Jan. 14, 1993, at 36, 38. [hereinafter Treaties Provi-
sions].
31 See id. at 36-39. The Treaties Provisions, which became effective on
September 30, 1992, increased the protection afforded to foreign works, thus
meeting the minimum requirements for copyright protection under the Berne
Convention; they do not, however, afford similar protection to domestic
works, which are still solely covered by the Copyright Law and the Software
Regulations. See id. at 38. The Treaties Provisions clarify that foreign works
covered by the Berne Convention or a bilateral treaty are protected, whether
the works are published or unpublished. See id. at 38-39. Also, this added
protection applies to intellectualproperty created by Sino-foreign joint ventures
and wholly foreign-owned ventures. See id. at 36.
China's laws already met the basic requirements under the UCC and the
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms ("Geneva Convention), so
those Conventions are not included in these Treaties Provisions. See
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unautho-
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The PRC's Copyright Law gives protection only to domestic
copyrights and foreign copyrightable works that are "first
published" in China. 8  The PRC's accession to the Berne
Convention circumvents this limitation, however, by granting
protection to all works attributed to nationals of any signatory of
the Berne Convention, commonly referred to as a member state,
as long as the works are in accordance with the appropriate
sovereign's copyright law and the Berne Convention's minimum
standards.39
Copyright administration and enforcement in the PRC is the
responsibility of the National Copyright Administration ("NCA")
and various local Chinese administrative authorities.' For
rized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 888
U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]; Zheng Chengsi, The Chinese
Copyright System and Three Relevant Copyright Conventions, COPYRIGHT
WORLD, Dec. 1992-Jan. 1993, at 33, 35. The PRC entered the Geneva
Convention on April 30, 1993, pursuant to a decision of the Standing
Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on November 7, 1992.
See Proposed Accessions by China to International Conventions, 15 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. D-6, D-6 (1993); White Paper: "Intellectual Property Protection in
China," BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 20, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter White Paper]. See generally
Geneva Convention, 25 U.S.T. at 309, 888 U.N.T.S. at 67 (containing the
copyright provisions of the Geneva Convention).
3 See Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 2.
39 See Berne Convention, supra note 28, arts. 2 & 3. U.S. copyrights are
protected as of March 17, 1992, the effective date of the MOU. See Pendleton,
supra note 23, at 119. There is no retroactive protection, however, for infringe-
ments that occurred before the effective dates of the international conventions
or any bilateral agreement. See Tan L. Khoon, Recent Developments in
Intellectual Property Law in the People's Republic of China, 15 EuR. INTELL.
PROP. REv. 176, 178 (1993).
0 See Khoon, supra note 39, at 178. The NCA was established at the
central level in 1985 and local departments have been created in most of the
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. See Muwen, supra note 3,
at 51. See generally Joseph T. Simone, Copyright in the People's Republic of
China: A Foreigner's Guide, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 23-26 (1988) (dis-
cussing various administrative organs set up by the Chinese National Copyright
Administration). The primary functions of the NCA include the following:
(1) to thoroughly implement copyright laws and regulations and to
formulate measures concerning copyright administration;
(2) to investigate and handle cases of copyright infringement which
have a major impact on the whole country;
(3) to approve the establishment of collective organizations for
copyright administration, copyright agents for foreigners and
arbitration organizations for contract disputes, and to
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instance, Article 8 of the Copyright Law states that "[t]he
copyright administration department under the State Council shall
be responsible for the nationwide administration of copyright."
41
Furthermore, Article 20 of the Treaties Provisions states that
"[t]he State Copyright Administration shall be responsible for the
implementation of international copyright treaties in China."'
In addition to administrative action, the Copyright Law
permits consensual arbitration or mediation for settling copyright
infringement lawsuits.43 The People's Courts are entitled to
refuse enforcement of an arbitration award if it is deemed
"unlawful."44  Article 34 of the Software Regulations provides
that "[ain infringement dispute over software copyright may be
settled through mediation."45 Article 48 of the Copyright Law
contains an analogous provision for copyright infringement.46
Furthermore, the Copyright Law permits a complaining party to
institute a lawsuit directly in a People's Court.4'
China's strong copyright laws and traditionally available
judicial avenues for enforcement, however, have not been enough
supervise and guide their work;
(4) to be responsible for the administration of copyrights involving
foreigners;
(5) to be responsible for the administration of copyrights vesting in
the State;
(6) to guide local copyright administration departments in their work;
(7) to undertake other copyright administration work assigned to it
by the State Council.
Implementing Regulations, supra note 18, art. 7.
41 Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 8.
42 Treaties Provisions, supra note 36, art. 20.
'3 See Copyright Law, supra note 17, arts. 48 & 49.
41 See id. art. 49. Mediation is the traditional and most common form of
dispute settlement in the PRC. See Durney, supra note 1, at 4. This preference
for mediation should not be overemphasized, however, because arbitration and
litigation will most likely become more prevalent as China moves closer to a
market economy. See Michael D. Pendleton & Zheng Chengsi, The Chinese
Copyright Law - Opportunities for Foreign Investors and-for China, COPYRIGHT
WORLD, July-Aug. 1991, at 41, 42 [hereinafter Opportunities for Foreign
Investors].
" Software Regulations, supra note 26, art. 34.
46 See Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 48.
R See id. Article 48 of the Copyrght Law also permits a party to institute
proceedings in a People's Court if mediation is unsuccessful. See id. Article 34
of the Software Regulations contains a similar provision. See Software
Regulations, supra note 26, art. 34.
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to thwart the growing copyright piracy problems in the PRC.48
This is due at least partially to a long-standing belief in China that
copying another's creative works is not morally bankrupt, a view
contrary to Western beliefs.49
The Chinese traditionally have viewed the copying of
another's intellectual work as a compliment to the creator."0
Also, "the Confucian disdain for profit motive prevailed over the
capitalistic drive which propelled intellectual property reform in
the West.""1 This belief is directly contradictory to Western
notions of intellectual property protection and is one of the
primary obstacles toward establishing an effective Western-style
copyright system in China. The PRC government has developed
its Intellectual Property Courts with the hope that such courts
may be able to break through these ingrained notions by both
educating the Chinese public about intellectual property protec-
tion issues and punishing wrongdoers. Sanctions meted out to
lawbreakers will emphasize the illegality of copying and could
create a potent deterrent to piracy and other copyright violations.
3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The many permutations of the Chinese government through-
out the twentieth century have resulted in dramatic shifts in the
4 See discussion infra sections 4 & 5.
4 One Chinese newspaper noted that there is "weak legal awareness"
regarding intellectual property rights and "[many people think that copyright
piracy has nothing to do with them and they only wish for cheap goods."
Renmin Ribao' on "Startling" Level of Copyright Infringement, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (excerpting from Yin Zhibo & Qiao Yang, Infringement of
Copyrights is Startling, RENMIN RIBAO (Beijing, China), Sept. 27, 1994, at 5)
[hereinafter "Startling" Level]; see also Brian Barron, Chinese Patent Legislation
in Cultural and Historical Perspective, 6 INTELL. PROP. J. 313, 330 (1991) (noting
that "[t]he concept of individuals holding exclusive rights in an article of
intellectual property ... [is] troublesome for a society with a traditionally low
tolerance for rapacious profit-seeking and a long political tradition favouring
state control over individual enterprise").
50 See William P. Alford, Don't Stop Thinking About... Yesterday: Why
There Was No Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law in Imperial
China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3, 18-34 (1993) (discussing the traditional Chinese
veneration of the past and the need of leaders and authors alike to legitimate
their authority by copying what has gone before them).
51 Yonay, supra note 1, at 538.
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nation's legal system. 2 During the period between 1957 and
1965, a budding, formalized, and independent judiciary was made
subservient to the Communist Party and many Chinese lawyers53
and other members of the judiciary were purged.-
As recently as the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party
regarded the PRC legal system with mistrust, apprehension, and
outright violence, resulting in considerable atrophy of legal
structures. 55  From 1966 to 1976, the legal profession was
"effectively decimated" and many of its members were executed
or received long-term sentences in labor camps.
5 6
The death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976 halted this
process of destruction. Since then, the adoption of a new
Chinese constitution in 1977 has re-established and substantially
overhauled the Chinese judicial system. 8  Still, the PRC's
present legal system has been described as "a complex mix of
socialist ideology, ancient practices, traditional values, and modern
2 Traditionally, there have been two divergent conceptions of Chinese
adjudication: a view favoring a legalist position on Chinese legal structures and
one which is influenced by the ever-present Confucianism within Chinese
society. See THOMAS CHIU ET AL., LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE PRC 1-2 (1991).
The legalist position is aligned with Western notions of adjudication. See id.
at 2. It fosters a general respect for laws and their equal applicability to all
people. See id. at 2. To the present day, Confucian notions of social heirarchy,
and the natural progression of human relationships, permeate the Chinese
culture, and are at odds with a uniform legal system. See id. at 1. The
Confucian concept of "Ii," which delineates the correct performance of religious
and social rituals according to social prominence is difficult to reconcile with
Western legal notions. See id. at 2. [A]ge, patriarchy, and status" determine
authority, respect, and order. Id. at 1. Legal formalism, or "fa," is regarded by
the Chinese as at odds with such beliefs. See id. at 1-3.
The Chinese legal system was fashioned specifically to support the
"natural" Confucian authoritative structure. See id. at 1. In contrast, within
the past 200 years, whether due to social realities or an increasing exposure to
the West, Chinese legal organs very slowly began taking on a more Western
flavor. See id. at 3.
31 There were nearly 2,500 full-time lawyers during this period. See id. at
31.
'4 See id. This newly formed judiciary was established by the First
Constitution of the PRC and the Organic Laws of the People's Court and
People's Procuratorate in 1954. See id. at 30-31.
55 See HARRY HARDING, CHINA'S SECOND REVOLUTION: REFORM AFTER
MAO 29 (1987).
56 CHIU ET AL., supra note 52, at 31.
17 See FOUR MODERNIZATIONS, supra note 12, at 1.
58 See id. at 3.
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legal principles."59
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China ("PRC
Constitution"), passed in 1982, considerably lessened the Commu-
nist Party's involvement in the legislative and judicial processes.'
An ideal behind the PRC Consitution was a return to the legal
reform initially undertaken before 1957, whereby the PRC
government would allow the Chinese judiciary to assume its place
as the chief adjudicatory apparatus in the PRC. Today, this is
more or less a reality.
Chinese judicial bodies now consist of Public Security Organs,
People's Procuratorates, and People's Courts 1.6  Article 123 of
the PRC Constitution declares that "t]he [P]eople's [C]ourts in
the [PRC] are the judicial organs of the state;" 62 consequently,
they exercise the bulk of the PRC's judicial powers.6 3 Article
124 of the PRC Constitution establishes "the Supreme People's
Court and the local [P]eople's [C]ourts at different levels, military
courts[,] and other special [P]eople's [C]ourts."64
The People's Courts have broad responsibility for adjudicating
s1 Opportunities for Foreign Investors, supra note 44, at 42.
60 See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA art. 123-35 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter XIANFA], translated in ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW app. 1 at 209, 235 (1987)
[hereinafter TECHNOLOGY TRANsFER LAW].
61 See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW, supra note 60, at 2. The vast
majority of criminal cases, those not handled by the People's Procuratorates,
such as corruption cases or those infractions which are beyond the jurisdiction
of the People's Courts, are the responsibility of the Public Security Bureau
("PSB"), which both investigates and determines initial criminal liability. See
CH1U ET AL., supra note 52, at 93. These bodies exist at all levels of Chinese
government. See id. Other PRC bodies that share policing functions with the
PSB are the State Security Bureau, which handles all cases dealing with foreign
espionage, and the People's Liberation Army. See id. at 97-99. The People's
Procuratorates are responsible for pursuing all public criminal prosecutions. See
id. at 78. The People's Procuratorates' power emanates from Article 129 of the
PRC Constitution. See XIANFA, supra note 60, art. 129. They have similar
independence and are subject to substantially equivalent restrictions as the
People's Courts. See CHIu ET AL., supra note 52, at 78.
62 XIANFA, supra note 60, art. 123.
63 See CHIJ ET AL., supra note 52, at 67. The People's Courts are neverthe-
less accountable to the NPC and its Standing Committee, the PRC's chief
legislative bod , and any other additional bodies of state power which may
create any of the lower courts. See XIANFA, supra note 60, art. 128.
Additionally, the NPC and its Standing Committee, and not the courts, decide
the proper final interpretations of statutes and the PRC Constitution. See
COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA, supra note 28, at 6.
' XIANFA, supra note 60, art. 124.
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four distinct types of issues: (1) criminal matters pursuant to the
Criminal Law of the PRC, (2) civil matters pursuant to the Civil
Law of the PRC, (3) economic matters, and (4) administrative
matters.6' Additionally, the People's Courts are demarcated into
four separate hierarchical levels. The first level is the Basic
People's Courts, which operate at the county level in Chinese
provinces, in Chinese autonomous regions, in Chinese cities
without districts, and at the district level in Beijing, Tianjing, and
Shanghai.66 The Basic People's Courts function as lower courts
of original jurisdiction only.' Second, there are Intermediate
People's Courts that function at the level of prefectures and
municipalities in Chinese provinces, the autonomous region level,
the regional level, and at the district level in Beijing, Tianjing, and
Shanghai.68 These Intermediate People's Courts operate as courts
of both original and appellate jurisdiction. 69 Next, there are
65 See CHIU ET AL., supra note 52, at 68-70. All People's Courts also are
required officially to set up judicial committees to "sum up the evidence at the
trial, to discuss earlier cases which are of relevance or give rise to difficulty[,]
and to make a decision in the dispute before it." TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
LAW, supra note 60, at 4.
" See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW, supra note 60, at 2. As of 1991,
there were over 2,700 of these Basic People's Courts throughout the PRC
which have the jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases in the first instance,
unless excluded by statute or preempted by one of the higher courts. See CHIu
ET AL., supra note 52, at 71. The cases they hear are usually of minor
significance, mainly due to higher courts' discretion to assert original
jurisdiction over cases involving issues of a greater magnitude or covering a
larger geographic scope (i.e. province-wide or national disputes). See id.
In addition, these Basic People's Courts may set up a limited number of
"people's tribunals," which are collegiate panels not authoritatively distinct
from the court that establishes them and whose decisions are reported as that
of a Basic People's Court. See id. There are in excess of 10,000 of these
adjudicatory bodies in existence, whose purpose is to hear especially minor
civil, economic, or criminal matters. See id.
67 See CHIU ET AL., supra note 52, at 71.
6s See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW, supra note 60, at 2.
69 See CHIU ET AL., supra note 52, at 72. There are over 300 such
Intermediate People's Courts in the PRC that also have original jurisdiction
over criminal, civil, and economic matters, and unlike the Basic People's
Courts, they may impose the maximum penalties of life imprisonment or
death. See d. These Intermediate People's Courts also may hear appellate
matters, but a party is allowed only one appeal, which becomes a final and
binding decision. See Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J.
CHINESE L. 245, 253 (1991). Also, People's Procuratorates that are not satisfied
with the findings of Basic People's Courts may appeal the decisions of such
courts. See CHIU ET AL., supra note 52, at 72.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
twenty-nine Higher People's Courts at the provincial level and in
Beijing, Tianjing, and Shanghai.' ° The Higher People's Courts
have original jurisdiction over the most pressing matters within a
province, autonomous region, or municipality.7' They also may
hear appeals taken from the Intermediate People's Courts. 2
Finally, the pinnacle of judicial authority in the PRC is the
Supreme People's Court, which sits in Beijing.73 The Supreme
People's Court may hear cases of first impression which are of
national dimension, such as when criminal charges are instituted
against very senior government officials.7 4 The court also has an
appellate function whereby it reviews the decisions of both the
Higher People's Courts and the Special People's Courts. 5
In addition to the four levels of regular People's Courts, which
customarily have general jurisdiction, there are Special People's
Courts which have authority over issues affecting the military,
railway transportation, forestry; and maritime law. 6 Since 1980,
for example, the Chinese government has created over 2,000
Economic Courts in order to pursue economic reforms and attract
foreign capital" They may hear both foreign and domestic civil
Unlike in the United States, however, judicial review is not limited to
appeals. A legislative body may order a review of any decision and can require
a retrial. See id. at 72. This procedure is used purportedly to "identify and
correct mistakes of law as well as any fundamental injustices that may have
transpired." Id.
70 See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW, supra note 60, at 2.
71 See CHItJ ET AL., supra note 52, at 72.
72 See id. at 72-73. As with the Intermediate People's Courts, original
jurisdiction resides with the discretion of the Higher People's Courts. See
Clarke, supra note 69, at 253. Additionally, these Higher People's Courts may
hear applications for review from the People's Procuratorates. See CHIU ET
AL., supra note 52, at 72-73. They are responsible for automatically reviewing
death penalty cases, whereby a report is given to the Supreme People's Court
for a final ruling, unless authority to do so themselves has been delegated. See
id. at 73.
73 See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW, supra note 60, at 2.
74 See CHIu ET AL., supra note 52, at 74.
' See id. Other powers of the Supreme People's Court include: (1)
supervising and administrating justice within the PRC; (2) approving death
penalty convictions; (3) interpreting of laws and statutes; (4) hearing protests
from the Supreme People's Procuratorate; (5) re-trying, or ordering a lower
court to re-try, a case in which it has found a legal mistake occurred, even if
the holding has already gone into effect; and (6) submitting bills to the NPC
or its Standing Committee. See id. at 73-74.
76 See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW, supra note 60, at 3.
77 See CHIU ET AL., supra note 52, at 73.
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matters implicating economic disputes."8
Parties with copyright infringement disputes increasingly are
turning to litigation in the People's Courts to settle their
differences. As the next section demonstrates, this process began
in April 1985, when the Higher People's Court in Jiangsu
Province ruled on the first "copyright infringement" case, more
than six years prior to the implementation of the Copyright
Law.79
4. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT
LITIGATION IN THE PRC
4.1. Copyright Disputes Prior to the Implementation of the PRC's
Copyright Law
4.1.1. The Jiang v. Qiao and the Film Hospital Ward
No. 16' Case
In 1985, even in the absence of a copyright statute, the
Supreme People's Court recognized that certain rights and duties
of ownership inured to "creators" of literary or artistic works.80
In an incipient Chinese "copyright" case, Jiang v. Qiao and the
Film Hospital Ward No. 16,' the defendant, Qiao, an author
employed by the Cultural Office of Nanjing City, Jiangsu
Province, wrote a novel which she subsequently drafted into a
screenplay under a contractual relationship with the Shanghai
Film Studio.81 Qiao mailed all her background material for the
novel, along with her first draft of the screenplay, to the plaintiff,
Jiang, who was employed by the Shanghai Film Studio, and then
78 See id.
"9 See COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA, supra note 28, at 35-40; Zheng Chengsi
& Michael D. Pendleton, China's First Court Decision on Copyright: Jiang v.
Qiao and the Film 'Hospital Ward No. 16,' 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 217,
217 (1990) [hereinafter First Court Decision].
" See First Court Decision, supra note 79, at 217 n.5. Such "creators" were
employed as authors by local government departments in charge of cultural
affairs. See id. They customarily had rights similar to copyright in the works
they produced, excluding documents and-the like produce or the government.
See id. The rights of these "creators" are superseded by the PRC's Copyright
Law. See id. at 217.
s1 See id. at 217.
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had little contact with him for over one and one-half years."
Desiring her screenplay to be filmed, Qiao then entered into
another contractual relationship with the Changchun Film Studio
to produce the film and thus gave the Changchun Studio a copy
of her screenplay.8 3 A critically acclaimed and profitable film
ensued.84 Jiang later heard of the agreement between Qiao and
the Changchun Studio and instituted a suit in a Basic People's
Court claiming that he should be named as coauthor of the
script.8" Jiang alleged that five minutes of the film was based on
revisions he had made to Qiao's screenplay.86
The significance of this issue was deemed great enough for the
case to be transferred from the Basic People's Court to the Higher
People's Court of Jiangsu Province. 7 In April 1985, the Higher
People's Court decided, after conducting a mediation, that the two
parties were "joint adapters" and should share copyright jointly.88
The Jiang decision is generally thought to have been a bad one
and a clear indication that Chinese copyright protection was
inadequate.8 9 The Jiang case made it evident that the drafters of
the new Copyright Law needed to take a close look at the myriad
of copyright protection problems, including, but not limited to,
satisfactory legal definitions of "joint authorship" and "joint
adaptation," and the basic lack of legal guidance for PRC judg-
s See id. Qiao and Jiang did engage in some preliminary editing to Qiao's
novel. See id.
83 See id. at 218.
84 See id.
s1 See id. at 217-18.
86 See id. at 218.
See id. Article 34 of the Chinese Civil Litigation Code ("Civil Code")
provides that "[w]hen a lower People's Court considers that the trial of a civil
case at first instance under its jurisdiction should be tried by a higher People's
Court, it may transfer it to that higher [People's] Court." COPYRIGHT LAW
IN CHINA, supra note 28, at 38. Additiona)r, Article 18 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]he higher People's Court has jurisdiction over the trial of civil
cases at first instance that have important influence in the region under their
jurisdiction." Id.
88 First Court Decision, supra note 79, at 218.
89 See id. at 218-19.
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es. 9
Additionally, the Jiang decision clearly went against the facts
of the case and is not considered a successful mediation. 91 The
only parties bound by the court-sanctioned mediation order were
Jiang and Qiao. 2 The Changchun Film Studio, a semi-state run
company,93 was free to continue its "infringement" and in fact
ignored the outcome of the mediation. 4 This quandry further
underscored the need for coherent copyright laws and emphasized
the limitations of copyright litigation without coherent copyright
laws or implementing regulations.
After the problematic Jiang decision, an increasing number of
copyright-like lawsuits were initiated after the enactment of the
Chinese General Principles of Civil Law in 1986 ("Civil Law"). 96
The Civil Law provides in Article 94 that "[c]itizens and legal
entities enjoy authors' rights ... ; they have, in accordance with
the law, the rights to claim authorship, to disclose or publish
* .. , and to receive remuneration. ... " A substantial number
of lawsuits were brought under this authority during the period
between 1988 and 1989.98
' See id. Article 13 of the Copyright Law successfully addresses this issue
by providing that "[w]here a work is created jointly by two or more coauthors,
the copyright in the work shall be enjoyed jointly by those coauthors.
Coauthorship may not be claimed by anyone who has not participated in the
creation of the work." Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 13 (emphasis added).
91 See First Court Decision, supra note 79, at 218. The defendant, Qiao,
went on to write numerous screenplays which became successful films, while
Jiang never published any literary work on his own. See id. at 218-19.
92 See id. at 219.
91 See id. at 218 n.6.
91 See id. at 219.
95 See id.
96 See COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA, supra note 28, at 40.
97 Id. at 40 n.58.
9' See id. at 40. An example of such a suit is the case of Xing v. Heh,
concerning the drama "Restaurant No. 1," which was decided by the Copyright
Office of the Beijing Cultural Bureau in 1989. See id. at 40-46. At that time,
Article 39 of the PRC's Trademark Law and Article 60 of the PRC's Patent
Law both allowed a complaining party to go either to an administrative
authority or directly to a People's Court for a settlement. See id. at 42 n.60.
Apparently, the same option existed by analogy for copyright-like infringe-
ments. See id.
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4.1.2. The Gao Cheng De v. UBTV Case
Another early case, Gao Cheng De v. UBTV, which was
decided by the Intermediate People's Court of Zhejiang Prov-
ince,99 further highlighted the ineffectiveness of pre-Copyright
Law copyright protection.100 The plaintiff was a professor at
Beijing University who gave lectures via radio to correspondence
students of the State University of Broadcasting and Televi-
sion. x01 The defendant, the Provincial University of Broadcast
and TV of Zhejian Province ("UBTV"), received copies of the
plaintiff's lectures and reproduced them for use by the defendant's
correspondence students without the plaintiff's permission and
without crediting him.102 The plaintiff, before the defendant
copied the lectures, turned the substance of his lectures into a
book, which was published and sold at approximately the same
time the defendant began releasing the audio tapes.0 3
The plaintiff sued UBTV requesting a cease and desist order,
a public apology, and damages."°  The Zhejiang Intermediate
People's Court held that the defendant's actions constituted "fair
dealing," and thus no copyright infringement occurred.05
Furthermore, the court stated that even if it had found infringe-
ment, it could not be classified as copyright infringement because
China had no law bestowing copyright protection on sound
recordings, and thus the court could not grant relief. ' 6  As a
result, the Intermediate People's Court rejected the plaintiff's
action, noting that the court considered adequate the defendant's
original compensatory offer to the plaintiff consisting of a private
apology and substantially lower damages than initially requested
by the plaintiff.'07
" See id. at 47.
100 See id. at 46-49. The case was couched in terms similar to those of a
"fair use" question pursuant to the U.S. copyright law under 17 U.S.C. S 107
(West 1993). See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164
(1994) (detailing the current state of U.S. caselaw on the question of "fair use").
101 See COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA, supra note 28, at 4647.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 47.
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See id. at 47-48.
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This case further highlighted the problems surrounding the use
of the Chinese judiciary to cure copyright infringements and
further exemplified China's need for a copyright law to deal with
disputes over copyrightable intellectual property. The decision
eventually spurred the Supreme People's Court and the Chinese
Copyright Office to start organizing intellectual property training
courses for both the staff of the PRC copyright administration
and People's Court judges.0 8
4.2. The Logistics of Bringing a Copyright Suit Pursuant to the
1991 Copyright Law
Article 46 of the Copyright Law states that
[a]nyone who commits any [number of specified] acts of
infringement shall bear civil liability for such remedies as
ceasing the infringing act, eliminating the effects of the act,
making a public apology[,] or paying compensation for
damages,... and may, in addition, be subjected by a copy-
right administration department to such administrative
penalties as confiscation of unlawful income from the act
or imposition of a fine.1' 9
..8 See id. at 48-49. Many copyright cases decided between the first People's
Court decision on copyright in Jiang and the passing of the Copyright Law in
1990 had a substantial effect on the drafting of the Law. See id. at 60-64 (listing
and briefly discussing the relevance of numerous copyright decisions prior to
1990). The bulk of these cases do not depart from the problematic pre-
Copyright Law court decisions as typified by teJiang and Gao Cheng De cases.
Thus, these older cases need not be analyzed within the context of this
Comment.
109 Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 46. Article 46 imposes civil liability
for the following acts:
(1) plagarizing a work created by another; (2 reproducing and
distributing a work for commercial purposes without the consent of
the copyright owner; (3) publishing a book where the exclusive right
of publication belongs to another; (4) reproducing and publishing a
sound recording or video recording of a performance without the
consent of the performer; (5) reproducing and distributing a sound
recording or video recording produced by another, without the
consent of the producer; (6) reproducing and distributing a radio or
television program produced by a radio station or television station
without.., consent... ; [or] (7) producing or selling a work of fine
art where the signature of an artist is counterfeited.
Id. Similar liability is imposed for various infractions under the Software
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Moreover, the Second Session of the Standing Committee of the
Eighth NPC enacted the "Decision of the NPC Standing Commit-
tee on Punishing Crimes of Producing and Selling Fake Commod-
ities," which added measures to the PRC Criminal Law to punish
pirates of protected intellectual property.110
In order to determine liability, the Copyright Law allows any
citizen, legal person, or organization to institute proceedings in a
People's Court "if mediation" is unsuccessful, . . . if one of the
parties fails to carry out an agreement reached by mediation,"'
"[i]f a people's court refuses to enforce an arbitration award,"1
if a party objects to an administrative penalty,"' or directly, if
the party so chooses.1
The People's Courts preside over public hearings in accordance
with Chinese substantive and procedural law.11 In many ways,
Regulations. See Software Regulations, supra note 26, art. 30. Article 45 of the
Copyright Law also establishes liability for numerous other infractions, but
does not provide for the imposition of penalties by a copyright administration
department. See Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 45.
Article 50 of the Implementing Regulations clarifies the administrative
penalties available under Article 46 of the Copyright Law, which include the:
1) issuance of a warning, (2) issuance of an order to cease production and distri-
bution of infringing reproductions, (3) confiscation of unlawful income, (4)
confiscation of infringing reproductions and production equipment, and (5)
imposition of fines. See Implementing Regulations, supra note 18, art. 50.
Article 51 of the Implementing Regulations specifies the pecuniary amount of
any fines available as a penalty for violations of Article 46 of the Copyright
Law. See Implementing Regulations, supra note 18, art. 51.
ho See Aipin&, supra note 14, at 35-36. Under Western pressure, the PRC
has increased criminal penalties for intellectual property violations. For
instance, a Chinese newspaper reported in November 1994 that over 100
Chinese citizens had been arreste[for compact disc piracy with one person
facing life imprisonment and three others facing the death penalty. See Hong
Kong Police Close CD Factories, UPI, Nov. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File [hereinafter CD Factories].
"I Copyright Law, supra note 17, art. 48.
1 Id. art. 49.
"1 See id. art. 50.
114 See id. arts. 48-49. Similar routes are available under the Software
Regulations articles 34-36. See Software Regulations, supra note 26, arts. 34-36.
"I All intellectual property cases are open to the public, unless otherwise
stipulated by law. The Beijing Municipal Intellectual Property Rights Court
announces each court session in advance and informs people in advance regard-
ing its monthly court session schedule. See Li Zhurun & Li Jun, Roundup' on
Intellectual Property Rights, XINHUA, May 20, 1994, microformed on FBIS-CHI-
94-099, at 31 (Foreign Broadcast Info. Serv.). Court procedure is governed by
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Chinese trials are conducted in a style familiar to Western
litigators. There is equality of all citizens before the law,11 6 a
basic right to a defense,117 a requirement that the plaintiff file a
bill of complaint detailing the claim (this may be done orally in
simple cases),1 and a mechanism whereby the parties may argue
their cases, but only after the court first has the opportunity to
adequately question the parties and their witnesses
There are, however, significant differences from Western-style
trials. Trials are quick relative to Western standards because pre-
trial discovery is unavailable to the parties. 2 In addition, PRC
judicial decisions "do not enjoy stare decisis status." 121 Thus, at
present, there are no clear judicial standards with respect to
intellectual property issues.2
A People's Court is responsible for hearing and executing its
own decisions.1 2' Accordingly, the increasing amount of intel-
lectual property litigation strained the existing court system due
to its unfamiliarity with the Copyright Law and its underlying
purposes. To alleviate this problem, the PRC developed new
Intellectual Property Courts in 1993.
the PRC Civil Procedure Law and the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. See
CHIU ET AL., supra note 52, at 87-89.
Each People's Court is made up of a president, who is elected by the
corresponding People's Congress (which has authority over the People's Courts
within its power), and a vice-president and judicial officers, who are appointed
by the standing committee of the People's Congress. See CHIU ET AL., su ra
note 52, at 75. The electing bodies also have the power to dismiss the People's
Court members, and they hold office until they retire or are dismissed. See id.
Legal training is not a requirement for any court position, and a test required
for promotion does not test only legal knowledge; rather, each officer is
required to have a broad knowledge of Marxist ideology. See id.
116 See Du XICHuAN & ZHANG LINGYUAN, CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: A
GENERAL SURVEY 93 (1990).
117 See id. at 95.
"' CrnU ET AL., supra note 52, at 87-88.
119 See id.
120 See id.
1 Yu Jianyang, Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R.C.: Progress,
Problems, and Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 140, 158 (1994).
12 See id.
123 See CHlU ET AL., supra note 52, at 88-89. A court decision may be
appealed to a higher People's Court if brought either 15 days from a judgment
or 10 days from a ruling. See id.
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4.3. The New Intellectual Property Courts
China's specialized Intellectual Property Courts 4 were first
established in Beijing at both the Intermediate and Higher
People's Court levels on August 5, 1993." They are designed
to handle a wide range of topics, such as patents, trademarks,
copyright, inventions, and contracts related to intellectual
property matters. 2 6 In 1994, the Higher People's Courts in four
other provinces and municipalities established Intellectual
Property Courts as well." The Intermediate People's Courts
in all of China's specialized economic zones and in Shanghai also
have established these new Intellectual Property Courts.128  The
Intermediate People's Courts in municipalities, in autonomous
regions, and in the capital cities of other Chinese provinces, have
set up collegial panels which are designated to hear intellectual
property cases.i 9 The President of the Supreme People's Court,
124 These courts are also referred to as Intellectual Property Tribunals or
Divisions, as well as Intellectual Property Rights Courts. For consistency, the
term Intellectual Property Courts will be employed throughout this Comment.
Additionally, since all levels of Chinese People's Courts can hear cases in the
first instance, see Zhurun & Jun, supra note 115, at 31, references to the
different levels of People's Courts have been eliminated in some discussions.
125 See State Forms Intellectual Property Rights Court, XINHUA, Aug. 5, 1993,
microformed on FBIS-CHI-93-150, at 30 (Foreign Broadcast In o. Serv.)
[hereinafter State Forms]. Between its establishment in 1993 and December
1994, the Beijing Intellectual Property Court accepted 331 intellectual property
cases and issued rulings on 172 of them. See Beijing Tribunal Makes Progress
with Intellectual Property Rights Cases, BBC MONITORING SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 15, 1994, available in Westlaw, TNT-NEWS
Database.
126 See State Forms, supra note 125, at 30. Even before the establishment of
the Intellectual Property Courts, various levels of courts in Beijing heard 727
intellectual property cases between 1985 and August 1993, of which 638 were
settled. See id.
127 These other Intellectual Property Courts are located in Shanghai
Municipality, Guangdong Province, Fujian Province and Hainan Province. See
Bu Yuntong, Hainan Sets Up Intellectual Property Court, XINHUA, Jan. 19, 1994,
microformed on FBIS-CHI-94-021, at 54 (Foreign Broadcast Info. Serv.);
Guangdong Sets Up 'Intellectual Property Court, XINHUA, Jan. 20, 1994,
microjormed on FBIS-CHI-94-018, at 71 (Foreign Broadcast Info. Serv.) (noting
that Guangdong was the first province opened to market forces and is the most
commercially active province); Zhurun & Jun, supra note 115, at 31.
128 See White Paper, supra note 37.
129 See id. These collegial panels, which are designed to ease the burden of
People's Courts, are closely tied to the People's Court which created them and
their power is derived directly from such People's Court.
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Ren Jianxin, recently announced that the Supreme People's Court
will set up its own Intellectual Property Court.13
Before the creation of Intellectual Property Courts, litigation
of intellectual property disputes occurred in either the Civil
Divisions or the Economic Divisions of the People's Courts.13'
The new Intellectual Property Courts generally are conducted as
tribunals and follow a similar procedure to their Civil Division
and Economic Division counterparts. 13 2  There are, however,
some noteworthy differences. Claims do not have to be presented
to an Intellectual Property Court in any special form for copy-
right cases,133 but a plaintiff must pay for court costs up front,
usually between 0.5-3.0% of the plaintiff's total claim.3 4  In
addition, all plaintiffs filing lawsuits in the Intellectual Property
Courts must file a "consularized Power of Attorney" upon
commencement of the proceedings. 35  This requirement is
contrary to the general PRC procedure, which allows courts to
130 See Intellectual Property: China to Establish Court to Enforce IPR
Protections, Ijuly-Dec.] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A223 (Nov. 20,
1995) [hereinafter China to Establish Court].
131 See Zhurun & Jun, supra note 115, at 31. As mentioned earlier, many
intellectual property disputes were heard before the new Intellectual Property
Courts came into existence. See discussion supra section 4.1. From 1986
through the end of June 1994, various Chinese courts tried 4,120 intellectual
property cases, including 1,329 copyright infringement cases. See China to
Protect Market Economy by Law, XINHUA, Oct. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
132 See A Beijing Court Hears a Software Case: Testing Protection, Bus.
CHINA, July 25, 1994, at 5 [hereinafter Software Case].
133 See id. at 6. In the Broad Mind Computer Co. case, discussed in section
4.4.2 of this Comment, the Chief Judge, Su Chi, briefed both parties and
outlined the rights and rules of the court. See id. Each side read their
statement of the claim or statement of defense, but the hearing had no formal
debate or question and rebuttal procedure. See id. Queries were posed by the
judges and the parties' representatives had an opportunity to answer. See id.
Also, Su used an evidence exchange procedure that he learned while studying
intellectual property law in Germany as there is no formal discovery in the
PRC. See id. Su mandated that the defendant had 14 days to respond to the
plaintiff's claim, then plaintiff had 14 days to reply, and so on until the court
was satisfied. See id. This procedure was supposed to save time over formal
discovery, but its efficiency is questionable.
134 See id.
135 See Robert Holleyman, Copyright Protection for Computer Software: A
Global Overview, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTiTUTE: 1995 313 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 416, 1995).
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begin proceedings while a request for a consularized Power of
Attorney is pending. 36 As a result of the PRC's Copyright Law
and China's accession to various international conventions, both
Chinese nationals and foreign enterprises have tested the waters of
these tribunals to determine if the PRC's enforcement of its laws
is as zealous as the scope of Chinese copyright legislation.
4.4. Recent Disputes Adjudicated Before the Intellectual Property
Courts
4.4.1. Domestic Copyright Infringement Case - The
China Golden Dawn Dispute
The first computer software copyright infringement case heard
by the Beijing Intellectual Property Court was China Golden
Dawn Safety Technology Co. v. Beiing Shijingshan Dist. Zhiye Elec.
Ltd., reported on January 4, 1994.' In that case, the plaintiff
developed, produced, and sold software for which it had a valid
copyright. The plaintiff caught the defendant "red handed" when
the plaintiff, accompanied by a PRC official, purchased software
from one of defendant's employees after the employee copied the
software right in front of the plaintiff and the official. 3
In light of such strong evidence, the Beijing Intellectual
Property Court, pursuant to Article 30 of the Software Regula-
tions,139 immediately ordered the defendant and all involved
third parties to cease pirating plaintiff's software, awarded
Rmb100,000 for economic loss, loss to reputation, court costs, and
legal fees, and awarded an additional Rmb50,000 for any costs
incurred in correcting the effects of defendant's activities."'
This case clearly demonstrates the court's willingness to
136 See id.
137 See Case Digest: Local Software Developer Wins Rmb150,000 Award for
Infringement, CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 11, 1994, at 19 [hereinafter Case Digest].
13 See id.
139 Article 30 of the Software Regulations prohibits both "copy[ing], or
copy[ing] in part, a piece of software without the consent of the copyright
owner of the software" and "distribut[ing] ... a copy of a piece of software
without the consent of the copyright owner of the software." Software
Regulations, supra note 26, arts. 30(61& (7).
'4' See Case Digest, supra note 137, at 19. "Rmb" is the abbreviation for the
Chinese unit of currency, the Renminbi. As of March 13, 1996, the exchange
ratio for Renminbi to the U.S. dollar was 8.3548 to 1. See Currency Trading:
Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1996, at C15.
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uphold a domestic PRC copyright when the evidence is strongly
against the defendant. 41 On the other hand, recent disputes
brought by foreign companies pursuant to the Berne Convention
or a bilateral copyright treaty apparently have encountered more
resistance.'4
4.4.2. The First Foreign Copyright Infringement Case -
The Broad Mind Computer Co. Dispute
The first foreign case brought in Beijing's Intellectual Property
Court after the PRC's accession to the Berne Convention was
instituted by Hong Kong's Broad Mind Computer Co. ("BMC")
against Beijing's Hai Wei Electronic Engineering Co. ("Hai
Wei") 43 BMC suspected Hai Wei's infringement of BMC's
copyright as early as 1989, but did not bring suit until 1993
because of the PRC's lack of software protection regulations.'
44
BMC filed a claim equivalent to US$800,000 in September 1993,
and the court began hearings on March 4, 1994.141
Initially, Hai Wei argued that the two-year statute of limita-
tions on BMC's claim had run, rendering BMC's claim inval-
141 This does not mean that domestic PRC companies do not have
difficulties. China's top software company, SunTendy, went to court to
protect its software from piracy, but complained that "there [was] a long queue
and the process [was] very slow, so we [tried] another channel by cooperating
with the local commerce bureau." China Computer Firm Seeks Piracy
Compensation, REUTER EUR. BUS. REP., Nov. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. After filing suit in October 1993, SunTendy was
forced to wait until June 1995 before the Beijing Intermediate People's Court
ruled in its favor. See Jeffrey Parker, China S6ftware Firm Eyes Precedent in
Piracy Case, REUTER ASIA-PAC. Bus. REP., June 21, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. This lengthy court process, however, may
indicate that factors other than guilt, such as political implications, affect
copyright litigation in China.
14' These disputes must be brought under the Berne Convention or a
bilateral agreement because, as noted earlier, the Chinese Copyright Law
protects only foreign works first published in China and domestic copyrights;
most foreign works do not fall under either category. See discussion supra
section 2.
143 See Carol P. Lai, Hong Kong Firm Files Suit in Software Copyright Case,
E. EXPRESS, Mar. 1, 1994, at 8, microformed on FBIS-CI-94-042, at 69-70
(Foreign Broadcast Info. Serv.).
144 See id. at 70.
145 See Software Case, supra note 132, at 5. BMC was required to advance
1% of its claim, or approximately US$8,000, to cover court costs. See id. at 6.
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id.' 46 BMC responded that the Copyright Law was not effective
until October 1991, thus precluding any lawsuit until after the
Copyright Law became effective.1 47 BMC alternatively argued
that even if the limitations period began running in 1988, Hal Wei
continued infringing on the copyright until well within the two-
year limit.14 ' The Beijing court found for BMC on these claims
and allowed the lawsuit to proceed.1 49
Hai Wei further contended that BMC did not have sufficient
evidence to prove ownership because BMC was required to show
actual infringement. 50 BMC attempted to do so by showing
catalogs, invoices, and research and development notes from as far
back as 1986.151 In addition, BMC demonstrated that Hai Wei's
software had the same bugs and defects as its own, which they
contended could not have happened unless Hai Wei copied exactly
BMC's work."
The Beijing Intellectual Property Court was not convinced by
BMC's argument and asked for Hai Wei's "source codes" within
fourteen days, which Hai Wei supplied. 3 Four months passed
without a ruling before the Beijing court indicated that BMC
would be required to supply even more information at a later
date. 4  During this period, however, Hai Wei was allowed to
continue its pirating activities and reap its purportedly illegal
profits. 1
55
Obviously, BMC had a myriad of complaints with the Chinese
judicial system. First, BMC concluded that the judges had only
a limited knowledge of general intellectual property matters.156
146 See id. at 5.
147 See id.
148 See id.
19 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See id
154 See id. It is uncertain whether there were any further developments in
this case subsequent to July 25, 1994.
5 See id. at 6. In order for BMC to get the Intellectual Property Court
to freeze the defendant's activities, BMC would have been required to post a
bond in an amount equivalent to its total claim. See id. This bond could have
been very costly, especially if BMC lost. See id.
156 See id. BMC felt that an inordinate amount of time was spent educating
the judges on the issues. See id. The judges previously sat on a regular
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Second, three officials from the Beijing Office of Computer
Software Registration were present only in an "informal capaci-
ty."157  These officials, who were apparently experts on the
Chinese Copyright Law and were thus capable of providing the
judges with valuable insights, were underutilized by the Intellectu-
al Property Court."8 This occurred, in part, because there was
no formal procedure by which to include them.5 9 Finally,
BMC believed that the Beijing court was severely understaffed. "0
BMC conceded, however, that "[t]he judges and court officials
were earnest in their efforts to be objective and did not demon-
strably [favor] the Chinese defendant."16'
This case illustrates that some foreigners are uncomfortable
and unimpressed with the current Intellectual Property Court
system. BMC, although providing clear evidence of infringement,
was unable to get any judicial relief. On the other hand, while
the BMC lawsuit highlights some fundamental problems concern-
ing the new Intellectual Property Courts, the copyright protection
framework is still young. Furthermore, not everyone has
Intermediate People's Court and apparently were assigned randomly to the
Intellectual Property Court. See id.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id.
16 See id. There were only three judges assigned to the Intellectual
Pro erty Court at that time. See id. There appears to have been a nationwide
problem of understaffing in the Intellectual Property Courts. One newspaper
article mentions that, as of February 1994, the Intellectual Property Courts
only employed a total of 100 people. See Mark Evans, Copyright Violators at
Odds with GA 7T, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 25, 1994, at 22, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. In contrast, a later PRC publication
reported that the Beijing court had 16 full-time workers, as of June 1994,
including a computer software expert. See Beijing Copyright Court Accepts 40
Overseas Cases, XINHuA, June 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File. Additionally, according to Chief Judge Su Chi, all Intellectual
Property Court judges in Beijing have at least five years of general judicial
experience and speak English. See id.
161 Software Case, supra note 132, at 6. One commentator has corroborated
this assessment by noting that the Intellectual Property Court appeared
"energized" and that the judges are trying to prove that the Intellectual
Property Court is "not just a showpiece." Mike Laris, In China, Challenging
the Pirates: Software Companies Test New Laws, Courts, WASH. POST, Jan. 3,
1994, at F13, F16. This same commentator opined that the judges on the
Beijing Intellectual Property Court are "among Beijing's top authorities on
intellectual property law," a view which differs completely from BMC's
impressions. Id.
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experienced as difficult a time as BMC did in obtaining relief.
4.4.3. The First Copyright Infringement Case Involving
a U.S. Party - The Walt Disne Co. Dispute
More than forty cases involving intellectual property matters
were brought by overseas parties and handled by the Beijing
Intellectual Property Court between January and November
1994.162 In January 1994, the first copyright infringement case
brought by a U.S. enterprise pursuant to the 1992 U.S.-Sino MOU
was instituted by the Walt Disney Co. ("Disney") against the
Beijing Youngsters and Children Publishing House ("Children
Publishing"), the Beijing Publishing House, and the Beijing
circulation department of Xinhua Bookshop.'63 The defendants
were, respectively, a book publisher, a book distributor, and a
book retailer.1"6  Another Chinese publisher, Great World
Publishing Co. ("Great World"), was brought into the suit as a
third party defendant. 65  The case was brought as a civil suit
because criminal sanctions were unavailable before July 5,
1994.166
Pursuant to Article 46 of the Copyright Law, Disney asked for
the following remedies: an injunction, an accounting of profits,
a public apology, and the equivalent of US$77,000 in damages.
16 7
Disney claimed that the defendants were all involved in the illegal
production and distribution of children's books using well-known
Disney characters like Mickey Mouse and Goofy without Disney's
162 See Mickey Mouse Victory in Intellectual Property Rights Cases, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File. The cases concerned companies from Hong Kong,
Macao, Taiwan, Europe, and the United States, and mostly involved copyright
issues, with over 30 suits filed by the United States alone. See id.
163 See Case Digest: Walt Disney Wins in Copyright Case, CHINA L. &
PRAG., Sept. 13, 1995, at 17 [hereinafter Walt Disney Wins].
164 See Sally Gelston, Intellectual Property Protection in China: New Criminal
Penalties for Copyright Violators, Disney Wins Copyright Suit, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., July 15, 1994, at 4, 5; Susan Orenstein, Case Goes to New
Beijing Court: Disney Duels with Chinese 'Pirates' Over Mickey, LEGAL TIMES,
July 25, 1994, at 2.
165 See Walt Disney Wins, supra note 163, at 17.
166 See Gelston, supra note 164, at 5.
167 See Orenstein, supra note 164, at 2; Developments in China, BUS. ASIA,
Aug. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. Punitive
damages are not available under Chinese copyright law. See Gelston, supra note
164, at 5.
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permission."' Disney itself does not manufacture goods in
China; rather, it sells licenses to parties in the PRC so that they
may make and sell Disney books, apparel, toys, and novelty items
using the Disney name. The defendants claimed that they
purchased such a license to sell Disney products and thus they did
not infringe Disney's copyrights.
169
The Beijing court found that the titles published and distribut-
ed by the defendant were identical to a series produced legally
under a license Disney had granted to a Hong Kong company, but
that the license had expired in September 1990."7° On August
4, 1994, the Intellectual Property Court held both the publisher
and the distributor liable for copyright infringement under the
Copyright Law for pirating children's books that British Maxwell
Communications Company, the Hong Kong licensee, had been
publishing and selling legally up until 1990.171
In May 1995, the Beijing Intellectual Property Court also
found the retailer liable. 72 The Beijing court awarded Disney
approximately Rmb227,000, the equivalent of US$27,360, in
damages to be paid as a lump sum by Beijing Publishing
House.173  The court also found Great World partially respon-
sible and ordered Great World to remit to Beijing Publishing
House approximately Rmb90,800. 4  Both Beijing Publishing
House and Great World were directed to pay close to Rmb6,000
in court expenses and Rmb40,OO0 in other legal expenses.17 5
Additionally, the court ordered a public apology from all three
"6 Disney obtained "evidence" by having some its employees purchase the
incriminating children's books on open display in one of the defendant's stores.
See Orenstein, supra note 164, at 2.
169 See id.
170 See Benjamin K. Lim, China Court Favours Disney in Key Copyright Suit,
REUTER ASiA-PAC. Bus. REP., Aug. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiap c
Library, Allasi File. Disney estimated that as many as 300,000 of the illegally
pirated books were produced between 1991 and 1993. See Gelston, supra note
164, at 5.
171 See Lim, supra note 170.
172 See Mickey Offered an Apology, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1995, at 4.
See Walt Disney Wins, supra note 163, at 17.
174 See id.
171 See id. The court imposed a fine of Rmb50,000 on the Beijing
Publishing House and seized nearly Rmb16,500 in combined illegal profits from
Xinhua Bookshop and Great World. See id.
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defendants 6 and also ordered all three defendants to stop their
illegal publishing activities.'77
Disney, however, was apparently more concerned with testing
China's resolve for enforcing its intellectual property laws, thus
creating a deterrent to future piracy,178 than with monetary
relief.179 Claire Robinson, Disney's vice-president for intellectu-
al property, stated, in reference to the lawsuit, that "[w]e're doing
this to set a precedent. . . . If we lose, it will be grounds for
further complaining. If we win, it will be precedent for further
success."
180
This decision is more promising than Disney's other forays in
the Chinese judiciary. In 1993, Disney brought evidence of
176 See Mickey Offered an Apology, supra note 172, at 4.
177 See Chinese Court Grants Disney Copyright Damages, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
Furthermore, the court ordered the seizure of "33,341 sets of the Disney
collections and colour films of such collections from Beijing Publishing House."
Walt Disney Wins, supra note 163, at 17.
178 Disney has about 70 boutique stalls in China's department stores, but
distribution has been impeded by the extent of piracy in the PRC. See
Bronwen Maddox, Chinese Pirates Fail to take Mickey Out ofDisney, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 1994, at 14. For example, a recent police raid on a Chinese factory
uncovered pirated videodiscs of Disney's film "The Lion King" before Disney
itself even had released it on videotape. See Jeffrey Parker, New Ally in War
on Copyright Theft. China Victims, REUTER ASIA-PAC. Bus. REP., Nov. 4, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
179 See Orenstein, supra note 164, at 14. Many U.S. companies, however,
are still skeptical about the effectiveness of favorable court rulings because of
the difficulty of enforcement. For instance, Art Barron, Chairman of Time-
Warner International, stated that "[t]his ruling should be good for everyone in
the entertainment industry. The problem is who enforces it, but it's a good
start." Maddox, supra note 178, at 14.
In a similar case, Microsoft Corp. sued for trademark infringement against
State-run South China University after it pirated 650,000 copies of Microsoft's
MS-DOS version 5, which the company claims cost it at least US$30 million.
See Pamela Burdman, Chinese Pirates Hurt U.S. Firms; Music, Software Sectors Hit
Hard, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 1994, at D1, D4; FrenchJ/V Wins in China's First
Foreign Trademark Case, EXTEL EXAMINER, Feb. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter French J/V Wins]. In contrast, the
perpetrators were only fined the equivalent of US$260, which was later
increased to approximately US$5,000. See Burdman, supra, at D4. Supposedly,
the infringers also were allowed to keep their molds and later evidence showed
the counterfeiting continued. See id. Microsoft claims that it spent over a
US$1 million in filing fees, legal costs, and other investigative costs. See id.
They have filed an appeal in de Beijing Intellectual Property Court and are
now asking for US$20 million in damages. See French JfV Wins, supra.
180 Orenstein, supra note 164, at 2.
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trademark infringement to the PRC's trademark agency."' The
Chinese government raided the pirates' factories and confiscated
various pirated goods.8 Disney spent over US$15,000 in legal
costs, but has so far only received a US$91 fine for their ef-
forts.'83 Chinese officials only assessed fines for the goods they
found on-site, not for any prior or future economic damages.
Also, Chinese officials dissuaded Disney from appealing.8 4  At
the time, Disney's assistant general counsel, Peter Nolan, re-
marked that "the remedies we're getting from the judicial system
[are] pitiful."'8
Despite its recent success, Disney - like Broad Mind Comput-
er Co.- found that maneuvering through the PRC's legal system
can be an exercise in frustration.'86 Claire Robinson commented
that Disney was "charting unknown territory... There has been
sort of confusion at every step." 187  At a preliminary hearing,
Disney's Chinese lawyers apparently completely misunderstood
the substance of Disney's argument.' Also, Disney claims that
1 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 Id.
186 Disney's Hong Kong counsel could not try the case because foreign
attorneys are not allowed to practice in Chinese courts, so the Hong Kong
firm's affiliate in the PRC chose local counsel. See id. This rule is still in place
despite a loosening of restrictions on foreign lawyers which should double the
number of foreign law firms in China in the next few years. See Wendy I.
Zeldin, More Foreign Law Firms To Be Allowed in China, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP., June 15, 1994, at 13-14. This technical encumbrance compounds the
problems faced by foreign enterprises trying to sue Chinese copyright infringers
because local Chinese lawyers are often ineffective counsel. Billy Robbins, of
the Los Angeles law firm Robbins, Berliner & Carson, an adviser to China on
intellectual property issues, has stated that in the PRC "[t]here [are] a lot of
lawyers who are sorely undertrained.... Some would never qualify to ...
practice law in the United States." Orenstein, supra note 164, at 2. This does
not mean that until foreign lawyers can directly represent their clients
litigations will necessarily fail. One attorney from the United States whose
firm has had extensive experience dealing with Chinese courts feels slightly
more confident about the possibility of winning in the Chinese courts. He
remarked that "[e]ighty percent of all litigations so far have been successful,
although we should have won all of them, since nobody brings a lawsuit in
China without ironclad evidence." Uli Schmetzer, China Taking the Wind Out
of Copyright Pirates' Sales, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 10, 1994, at 1, 14.
187 Orenstein, supra note 164, at 2.
188 See id.
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they had to point out some of the available remedies under the
Copyright Law to their Chinese counsel, who should have known
the law themselves." 9
On the other hand, Disney's achievement of the US$27,360
award against Beijing Publishing House may be an indication that
the Chinese legal system is now more capable of correctly
adjudicating and remedying copyright infringements. In actuality,
this latter view is not satisfying because of the continued disap-
proval of Chinese copyright protection voiced by many U.S. and
other Western governments and corporations.
4.4.4. Caveats Regarding Use of the People's Courts to
Enforce Copyrights
Portions of the largest copyright suit brought by U.S.
companies in the PRC to date are still pending in Beijing's
Intellectual Property Court. Software makers Microsoft Corpora-
tion, Autodesk, Inc., and Lotus Development Corporation, part
of the Business Software Alliance ("BSA"), a U.S. software
industry trade group, have filed lawsuits against five Beijing
companies for ten separate counts of alleged copyright infringe-
ment. 90 Recently, there have been some notable successes for
the BSA. On October 12, 1995, for example, the Beijing Intellec-
tual Property Court found Beijing Juren Computer Co. guilty of
infringing the copyrights of BSA members Autodesk, Novell, and
Microsoft.' 9'
Microsoft alone estimates its losses from blatant copyright
189 See id.
190 See Three U.S. Software Makers, Including Microsoft, Sue Chinese Firms,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File [hereinafter U.S. Software Makers]. The purported pirates are
northwest Beijing companies Giant Group, Gaoli Computer Co., Sanhua
Electronics, Huili Computer Co., and Huiqin Computer Shop. See id. Court
officials claim that the plaintiffs are asking for between US$10,000-US$30,000
for each count of infringement. See Microsoft, Lotus, Autodesk Sue Chinese Firms
for Copyright Infringements, AFX NEWS, July 27, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
191 See Asian Piracy Crackdown Continues, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK,
Oct. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Chinese Firm
Found Guilty in Copyright Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at D2. In June
1995, these U.S. companies received US$78,276 in damages from Beijing Gaoli
Computer Co. See Louise Kehoe, Chinese Group Guilty of Piracy, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1995, at 6.
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/14
1996] CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURTS 447
violations in the PRC to be in the billions of U.S. dollars.
192
For instance, Microsoft representatives state that it sold 4,000
copies of its Windows application in China between October and
December 1993, but for each legal copy sold, they contend that
there were ten illegal copies produced. 93  To acquire a version
of Windows in one Beijing shop, all it took was twelve floppy
diskettes and an additional Rmbl0 (totaling about Rmb200), as
opposed to the original price of Rmb980 for a legal copy.19 4
Thus, much more needs to be done to curb the actions of these
Chinese copyright pirates.
Nevertheless, many U.S. companies continue to expand their
business operations in the PRC. For example, Microsoft wishes
to enter into more joint ventures with Chinese-owned enterprises
and also would like to set up a wholly owned subsidiary to search
for such possibilities.' 9' These new operations may increase the
likelihood of copyright violations. In order to combat this
eventuality, foreign companies can institute lawsuits in the
Intellectual Property Courts. Foreign enterprises should keep in
mind many of the fundamental difficulties associated with suing
for copyright infringement in such courts. 19'
192 See U.S. Software Makers, supra note 190. The U.S. Trade Office
estimates that 94% of all software in use in the PRC is pirated. See Donna
K.H. Walters, Chinese Court for First Time Upholds U.S. Firm's Copyright, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at D1, D5. Foreign sofware companies' losses from in-
fringement in China are thought to be approximately US$255 million for 1992,
while losses to U.S. software makers alone were over US$320 million in 1993.
See Evans, supra note 160, at 22. To put these figures in perspective, however,
one newspaper article estimates that U.S. firms lost somewhere between
US$8.1-17 billion worldwide from all forms of intellectual property piracy in
1993. William Flannery, Piracy Overseas Threatens U.S. Firms Patent. Patent
Violations, Counterfeiting of Products Contribute to Billions Lost, ST. LouIs
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 1994, at 5D [hereinafter Flannery, Piracy Overseas].
'93 See Laris, supra note 161, at F13.
194 See "Startling" Level, supra note 49. Yet, Microsoft is still planning to
sell its new Windows '95 application in the PRC, with help from China's Great
Wall Electronics group. See Microsoft, China CoOperate on Windows 95, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 13, 1994, at 8. Ideally, they want to increase annual revenue from
China to US$200 million within the next 2-3 years, but they admit it will
probably not be possible unless piracy is contained. See id.
19' See China Politics: Software Piracy Still Rampant, EIU VIEwSWIRE, Sept.
20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter China
Politics].
196 See, e.g., Tara K. Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in
a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 353 (1993-94).
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There are significant flaws in the Chinese legal system which
might deter the expansion of foreign enterprises into China. First,
Chinese damage awards have characteristically been small by
Western standards.197 Even when People's Courts have awarded
damages, collecting judgments can be very difficult. This
inadequacy may be attributed to the exceptionally weak enforce-
ment power of the People's Courts, including the Intellectual
Property Courts.198 Penalties for declining to heed a Chinese
court order are virtually nonexistent. 99 Additionally, People's
Courts have little power to compel other Chinese governmental
bodies to enforce their orders and any such power, if it exists at
all, is derived from the governmental status of individual judges,
not the People's Courts themselves.2°' Finally, participation by
local Chinese authorities generally is needed to enforce People's
Court orders, which they might be unwilling to offer if doing so
would be detrimental to their authority, especially if the judgment
comes from a jurisdiction outside the scope of such officials'
197 See, e.g., Paul Blustein, U.S. Warns China to Step Up Efforts Against
'Piracy,' WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at B13. The awards, however, have been
increasing. The Beijing Intellectual Property Court ordered a Beijing company
to pay a Taiwanese publisher Rmb270,000, approximately US$31,800, for
copyright infringement. China Court Makes Record Copyright Award, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File. The largest award to date, Rmb13 million, was awarded recently to a
Chinese company for infringement of its computer software copyrights by a
domestic competitor. See $1.5m Bill for Beijing Pirate, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1996, at 5. The People's Court also required the infringer to immediately stop
production of the illegal software and ordered a public apology. See id. In
another recent case, a Shanghai Intermediate People's Court ordered a compact
disc pirate to pay over Rmb7 million to the Chinese record industry, and
ordered that the infringer stop illegal production and publicly apologize. See
CD Pirate Gets Jail Term and $7m Fine Over Counterfeits, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 8, 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. One
report argues that awards in the RmblO0,000 to Rmb200,000 range are
significant for small and medium-sized Chinese enterprises to pay. See China -
Govt Emphasizes Foreign Copyright Protection, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK,
Aug. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
198 See Clarke, supra note 69, at 263; see also Seth Faison, Pirates Show Their
Colors; Chinese Firms Start to Defy Courts, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 18, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that "[r]apid economic
growth and receding regulation are making Chinese companies less accountable
and more difficult to prosecute" and that "[Chinese companies are] more afraid
of their shareholders than they are of the court").
199 See Clarke, supra note 69, at 264.
200 See id. at 265.
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authority.
20 1
Second, corruption is a significant problem in the PRC. Many
Chinese infringers are protected by Chinese officials and, conse-
quently, are beyond the Intellectual Property Courts' ability to
prosecute.2 2 For instance, there are twenty-six major compact
disc manufacturers in the PRC and they are all semiofficial State-
owned companies, which decreases the possibility that they will
be prosecuted.203 In effect, one branch of the government would
be prosecuting another. Moreover, many of the PRC's compact
disc factories are joint ventures with Hong Kong or Taiwan firms
who sought partners among the relatives of officials in the
Communist Party.'° The Chinese Trade Minister has confided
that at least one such factory is "untouchable" because of its
owner's ties with the Chinese military (the Trade Ministry is
weak, especially compared to the PRC military).2°
Furthermore, local and national Communist Party officials
have been known to interfere with intellectual property infringe-
ment lawsuits.2 6 Traditionally, local Communist Party officials
reviewed and approved judicial outcomes. 27 While this is no
longer a universal occurrence, it still most likely continues to a
lesser degree today.0 This interference also may come in the
form of meddling in a lawsuit by higher court officials.2, 9 In
addition to these external forms of corruption, the salaries of
Chinese judges and court officials are relatively low, which makes
them susceptible to corruption and bribery.
210
201 See id. at 266.
202 See Amy Borrus et al., Will China Scuttle Its Pirates?, Bus. WK., Aug. 15,
1994, at 40.
203 See Schmetzer, supra note 186, at 14.
204 See id.
205 See Borrus et al., supra note 202, at 40.
206 See id.
207 See Clarke, supra note 69, at 261.
201 See id. at 262. On February 28, 1995, however, a new Judges Law of
the PRC became effective. See New Law Digest. National: Legal System, CHINA
L. & PRAC., Mar. 31, 1995, at 9 [hereinafter New Law Digest]. It is still too
early to gauge the new law's effectiveness, but Article 43 holds administrative
authorities, social organizations, or individuals liable if they "interfere with the
lawful adjudication of cases by judges." Id.
209 See Clarke, supra note 69, at 260.
210 See id. at 259-60; see also Schmetzer, supra note 186, at 14; Flannery,
Piracy Overseas, supra note 192, at 5d (noting that China has weak court
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Third, there appears to be a general lack of legal training
among PRC judges, especially relating to intellectual property
issues z.2 1  There are only a limited number of "qualified"
individuals in China who have the knowledge to become effective
judges. Because the current legal system is so new, many of the
Chinese who do have a legal education are too young to serve as
judges. For instance, Professor William Alford, Director of
East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law School, notes that
because Chinese judges are politically appointed, and the Chinese
court system and tolerance for lawyers are both relatively new,
many Chinese judges, rather than being legal professionals, are
retired army sergeants and have no formal legal training.213
This lack of education may be particularly devastating because
the Chinese judicial system, unlike the U.S. adversarial system, is
inquisitional.214 Judges in many instances must find facts based
on their own initiative.215 Moreover, determining which law is
applicable can be similarly difficult. Chinese law is a confusing
array of laws and regulations; there may be no law on point or
the laws that do exist may contradict one another.216  Also,
there is no case reporting system in the PRC comparable to those
used in the West, making the research of caselaw precedent nearly
systems).
211 See id. This lack of experience, however, is not universal. Justice
Zongyi Fei, a member of the Supreme People's Court, is extremely well-versed
in intellectual property law. In early 1994, for example, he traveled to Los
Angeles for four days to meet with U.S. legal and business professionals to
discuss intellectual property matters. See Iris Yokoi, Chinese Jurist in U.S. to
Study Laws, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at 9.
212 See Clarke, supra note 69, at 257. Judges have been known to use their
law clerks as "substitute judges" to fill in when there are shortages of available
judges. See id. at 258.
213 See Flannery, Piracy Overseas, supra note 192, at 5d. There are no
formal objective requirements for judges in the PRC. See Clarke, supra note
69, at 258.
214 See Clarke, supra note 69, at 258.
215 See id. Parties to a Chinese lawsuit must still present evidence to
support their assertions. See Derek Dessler, Comment, China's Intellectual
Property Protection: Prospects forAcheiving International Standards, 19 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 181, 229 (1995). One way Intellectual Property Courts have been
obtaining evidence is by ordering raids of suspected Chinese pirates. See Phillip
Shenon, Chinese Accused of Pirating Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at D1,
D14.
216 See Clarke supra note 69, at 258-59.
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impossible.217 Thus, even the basic tenets of the Chinese legal
system can prove frustratingly difficult to identify for judges and
parties alike.218
Fourth, Intellectual Property Court fees, calculated by
charging a percentage of damages claimed and payable by a
plaintiff in advance, can deter suits because there is no guarantee
that a claimant will win.219 Moreover, these fees may not be
balanced by sufficient damage awards by the People's Court.2°
Fifth, it may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to continue
doing business in China to sue because doing so may wreck their
"guanxi" - personal contacts or favors - that are integral for
doing business in the PRC.221 Finally, the Intellectual Property
Courts have long dockets with extended waiting periods; thus
securing relief may be protracted.' For example, one Hong
Kong attorney reiterated some foreigners' feelings that "[i]n
practice, remedies are more likely to be forthcoming through the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce in the form of
raids and confiscation than through the courts. " '
While these problems may be daunting, Western companies
like Disney have achieved some modicum of success. Moreover,
China's Copyright Law and the Intellectual Property Courts are
both in embryonic stages. Given time and an opportunity to
correct some of their problems, they may yet provide formidable
weapons for use by foreign entities to combat illegal piracy.
There are, however, factors other than the efficacy of the
Intellectual Property Courts which must be considered, without
which copyright protection will be extremely difficult. In all
217 See id.
218 The new PRC judges Law was promulgated to help eradicate some of
these problems by "detaiing the duties, rights, obligations, qualifications,
appointment, dismissal, ranking, examination, training, awards, penalties,
employment treatment[,] and resignation of judges," thus solidifying the
responsibilities and duties of Chinese judges. See New Law Digest, supra note
208, at 9. As mentioned, this new law is still untested; hence its efficacy is far
from certain. See id.
219 See When the Talking is Over in China, EIU Bus. CHINA, Feb. 20, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File [hereinafter Talking in China].
220 See id.
221 See Laris, supra note 161, at 16.
See China Politics, supra note 195.
2 Ian Young & Andrew Wood, Intellectual Property: At Risk?, CHEMICAL
WK., Aug. 31/Sept. 7, 1994, at S44.
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likelihood, the Intellectual Property Courts will not provide the
sole solution to the pervasiveness of Chinese copyright piracy,
even if the problems enumerated above were resolved. But in
combination with improvements in other extrajudicial areas, the
Intellectual Property Courts may provide a strong deterrent to
Chinese copyright piracy.
5. ExTRAJUDICIAL FACTORS NECESSARY TO EFFECTIVELY
CURB COPYRIGHT PIRACY
U.S. companies lost an estimated US$866 million in 1995 due
to intellectual property piracy in the PRC. 4  Because of the
size of this problem, even a well functioning Chinese judiciary
cannot solve it entirely on its own. Despite some acknowledged
successes against Chinese copyright pirates in the Intellectual
Property Courts,M copyright piracy continues to be widespread.
Thus, in early 1995, the United States increased its pressure on
the PRC to help protect U.S. companies from Chinese copyright
infringement.3
In June 1994, a six month investigative period was initiated by
United States Trade Representative ("USTR") Mickey Kantor
under "Super 301" of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 7 in order to study China's abuses of intellectual
property rights." The PRC government labeled this move
"rude, unacceptable[,] and unreasonable." 2' When the investi-
gative period closed, the USTR threatened to impose 100 percent
duties on Chinese imports equivalent to the estimated losses to
U.S. companies caused by China's failure to enforce intellectual
property laws.Y0 The PRC responded with equivalent threats
of its own, setting the stage for a full-scale trade war. 31  Pro-
posed U.S. sanctions included: US$465 million on plastic goods,
US$294 million on shoes and apparel, US$108 million on cellular
phones, US$78 million on sporting goods, US$70 million on
14 See Blustein, supra note 197, at B13.
' See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
226 See Blustein, supra note 197, at B13.
22 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418,
1302(a), 102 Stat. 1176 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2420).
" See Lim, supra note 170.
229 Id.
230 See U.S., China Edging Back to Table, CHi. TRiB., Feb. 7, 1995, at 3.
231 See id.
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wood items, and US$65 million on bicycles. 2
On February 26, 1995, the United States and China signed an
unprecedented trade pact 3 described as "the most comprehen-
sive and detailed copyright enforcement agreement [U.S. officials]
had ever negotiated with any country," which averted the
threatened sanctions.3 4  Part of this Sino-U.S. Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement ("Sino-U.S. Agreement") included an
immediate six-month crackdown on copyright violators consisting
of "a series of task forces to collect evidence, the expansion of
search-and-destroy powers for Chinese customs officers[,] and the
immediate removal of quotas on imports of [U.S.] films."25
The Sino-U.S. Agreement also was designed to produce long-term
benefits, including: (1) increased access to the People's Courts for
U.S. copyright infringement claimants and preservation of
evidence while trials are pending;26 (2) a stricter customs system
modeled after the U.S. Customs Service;217 and (3) title verifica-
tion systems for copyrighted material.2s
232 See Flannery, Who Will Bend Most, supra note 22, at 6C.
" See P.R.C.-U.S.: Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb.
26, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 881 (1995) [hereinafter SIno-U.S. Agreement].
" Seth Faison, U.S. and China Sign Accord to End Piracy ofSoftware Music
Recordings and Film, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al. Despite this February
1995 Sino-U.S. Agreement, talks between the United States and China over the
PRC's re-entry into GATT have stalled over various issues, including a major
obstacle, enforcement of intellectual property rights. See id. China hoped that
with the new trade pact in place, its entry into the World Trade Organization
("WTO") would receive further serious consideration. See id. China's entry
into the WTO is unlikely, unless significant progress is made toward
effectuating the goals of the Sino-U.S. Agreement.
235 Id.
" In a letter to USTR Kantor dated February 26, 1995, Wu Yi, the head
of China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, asserted that
China's courts would be effectual in decreasing copyright piracy. See Sino-U.S.
Agreement, supra note 233, 34 I.L.M. at 882-83. Wu noted that China's
Supreme People's Court would "address intellectual property cases expeditious-
ly, including cases involving foreign right holders." Id. at 883. Additionally,
she confirmed that the People's Procuratorates were "actively pursuing criminal
infringement cases." Id.
237 See id. at 900. The goal of intensified customs procedures was to
prevent the import or export of goods that infringe on China's intellectual
property laws. See id.
See Implementation of the U.S.-China Intellectual Proet Right
Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacijic Afairs olf the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Statement of
Steven J. Metalitz, Vice President and General Counsel of the International
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Ultimately, the success of the Sino-U.S. Agreement depends on
the resolve of Chinese authorities to enforce antipiracy laws."'
It is clear, however, that the Sino-U.S. Agreement generally has
not lived up to expectations. While acknowledging some
improvement since February 1995, many in the U.S. software
industry believe that Chinese copyright protection needs to be
significantly improved. 24° Deputy USTR Charlene Barshefsky
noted in November 1995 that China's enforcement of the Sino-
U.S. Agreement has remained weak, and that the PRC must
"honor fully its commitments" or face further pressure from the
United States. 241 Many of the problems existing before the Sino-
U.S. Agreement continue to plague domestic and foreign copy-
right owners.242
The most serious problem, acknowledged by both foreign
enterprises and PRC officials, is the need for stronger enforcement
of copyright legislation.243 China has a well-formulated system
Intellectual Property Alliance) [hereinafter Metalitz Statement], available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, Curnws File. It was hoped that such verification
systems would be a "key tool for cracking down on unauthorized production
of copyrighted material." Id.
" See David C. Johnston, U.S. Business Favors Deal, with Caution, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at D6. Some U.S. technology firms are convinced that
the piracy of copyrighted commodities will continue until the Chinese are
prosperous enough to afford them legally, notwithstanding enforcement efforts.
See, e.g., Laris, supra note 161, at F16.
240 See Metalitz Statement, supra note 238; Blustein, supra note 197, at B13.
241 See International Trade, Barshefsky Demands China Halt Pirated Compact
Disks, CD-ROMs, [1995] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A219 (Nov. 14,
1995) available in LEXIS, News Library, Drexec File. USTR Kantor noted that
as of November 1995, 29 Chinese factories were producing pirated compact
discs, the same number that were doing so before the Sino-U.S. Agreement was
signed. See id.
Chinese officials also recognize the post-Sino-U.S. Agreement shortcomings
of Chinese copyright protection. Ren Jianxin, the Chief Judge of the Supreme
People's Court, noted that "[w]e not only need to further perfect relevant laws
and apply for participation in more international conventions, but [we need]
also to reform the country's existing intellectual property rights management
system and strengthen the attack on activities involving infringements on such
rights." See China to Establish Court, supra note 130.
242 See, e.g., Laris, supra note 161, at F16; Talking in China, supra note 219.
243 See Talking in China, supra note 219. Professor William Alford,
Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law School, believes that "[t]he
Chinese actually have some nice-looking laws ... but the problem comes in
enforcement. In my view, the [Chinese officials] lack a respect for the rule of
law, lack a consciousness about the rights of people[,] and-have a weak court
system." Flannery, Piracy Overseas, supra note 192, at 5d.
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of copyright laws and a complete judicial apparatus, but neither
is entirely effective without government cooperation and enforce-
ment, particularly due to the traditionally subordinated position
of the judiciary within the PRC's political system.
244
Currently, the Chinese government appears reluctant to
enforce intellectual property rights, and in some cases it directly
contravenes its own legal standards. Although the Chinese
government has made minimal efforts to prosecute copyright
infringers, piracy is still rampant.2 45  In fact, it is believed that
Chinese pirates have been protected by Chinese government
officials, undermining the effectiveness of enforcement efforts.246
Local copyright officials are underpaid and, consequently, easily
corrupted. 24 Accordingly, one specialist on U.S. trade with
China stated that "piracy is not just a problem, it is a fundamen-
tally ingrained part of China's economic plan."248
The Sino-U.S. Agreement has done little to alleviate this
situation. For instance, the anticipated title verification systems
have been established for audio-visual works only, ignoring
significant piracy of sound recordings and software.249  In
addition, it has been observed that directed enforcement activities
Song Jian, a top Chinese lawmaker, acknowledges that China's internation-
al image has suffered from lax enforcement of laws prohibiting copyright
piracy. See China's Piracy Woes Tarnish Image, UPI, July 30, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
244 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., James Riley, China "Flouts' Piracy Law, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (reporting
that since crackdowns on music compact disc piracy in China, pirates have
switched to aggressively producing software CD-ROMs, which have a lower
profile in the international community); but see CD Factories, supra note 110
(reporting that a 1994 crackdown in China's Guangdong Province resulted in
searches of more than 7,700 stores and uncovered over 1 million pirated
compact discs).
246 An executive at a U.S. brand-name clothing producer asserted that
"[l]ocal authorities protect the manufacturers of counterfeit products because
it's good for the local economy - and good for them." Sheila Tefft, U.S.
Message to China: Punish Patent Pirates, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Oct. 28,
1994, at 9.
47 See Talking in China, supra note 219.
248 David E. Sanger, Japan's Ghost in China Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995,
at D1, D6 (quoting Gregg Mastel, a senior fellow at the Economic Strategy
Institute).
249 See Metalitz Statement, supra note 238.
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are the exception, not the rule.210
China must redouble its antipiracy efforts by hiring and
effectively training more officials to enforce its intellectual
property laws, by discouraging government protection of these
illegal operations, and by vigorously enforcing all civil and
criminal sanctions available. 1  Without the implementation of
such strong enforcement measures the PRC's copyright legislation
and the People's Courts essentially will be ineffective in curbing
copyright violators.
A related problem is the lack of education regarding copyright
issues. The vast majority of Chinese officials and the Chinese
populace are not familiar with the general principles of intellectual
property law, let alone its intricacies. 2  As was noted above, it
has been accepted historically in China that copying the work of
another is considered complimentary.23 Enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights was traditionally motivated by a desire to
maintain the state's power, not to promote original author-
ship.' The Chinese government exacerbates the situation by
failing to disseminate publicly information on piracy and enforce-
ment.25
In order to confront this lack of education and traditional
disregard for intellectual property protection, the Chinese must
employ several tactics. Judges and officials of the Intellectual
Property Courts at all levels should study and research copyright
related technology, laws, regulations, and international treaties.
These court members should summarize their experiences and
share them with peers, possibly by writing Western-style law
journal articles. Also, the Intellectual Property Courts should
select and publish some typical copyright cases to publicize and to
250 See id.
251 BSA vice-president Stephanie Mitchell opined that "until someone goes
to jail, no one pays attention" to the law. Intellectual Property, Chinese Legal
Officials Outline Harsh Penalties for IP Violators, [1994] Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA), at A98 (May 24, 1994).
252 See Stephen Keating, China Gets Word on Software Piracy, DENVER
POST, May 6, 1995, at ID (quoting U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder's
statement that "[10] years ago, [the Chinese] didn't have a concept of private
property. Now [the West has] to educate them about intellectualproperty").
253 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
254 See Alford, supra note 50, at 17.
255 See China Politics, supra note 195.
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promote legal awareness about copyright issues. 56
Furthermore, the PRC should continue to establish and
support intellectual property departments at its major universities
to place such education within the grasp of more Chinese and
foreigners. China already has established intellectual property
departments at several of its top universities. On December 15,
1993, Beijing University became home to the first Chinese school
to teach and research intellectual property. The first class
consisted of forty-five graduate and double-degree students, but no
specific degree will be awarded when the students complete their
two or three years of study in the program."8 Shanghai Univer-
sity also has decided to open an intellectual property depart-
ment. 9 The Chinese government needs to pursue its education-
al propaganda campaign2 60 by sponsoring official seminars to
provide the Chinese people with information on intellectual
property matters.
To enhance copyright protection, in addition to enforcement
and education, the Chinese government should continue to
support nongovernmental intellectual property rights groups, such
as the Zhongcheng Intellectual Property Rights Protection Service
Company Limited ("Zhongcheng").261 Chinese companies often
neglect to protect their own copyrights, disregard others' infringe-
ments of their copyrights, or infringe themselves.26 2 Companies
such as Zhongcheng can help by providing their clients with
technical and legal advice on copyright issues.263
In August 1995, China formed its first intellectual property
" See Laris, supra note 161, at F13 (describing typical cases before these
courts).
2" See Xie Liangjun, School on Intellectual Property Rights Opens, CHINA
DAILY, Dec. 16, 1993, at 3, microformed on FBIS-CHI-93-241, at 33 (Foreign
Broadcast Info. Serv.).
258 See id.
2'9 See Shanghai Protects Intellectual Property, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct.
31, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
260 See, e.g., Evans, supra note 160, at 22 (noting Beijing's use of media
reports and propaganda to publicize its enforcement of intellectual property
laws).
261 See Aipin&, supra note 14, at 36. Zhongcheng is a joint venture between
Chinese International Economic and Legal Counseling Company and Hong
Kong Chung-shing International Company Limited. See id.
262 See id.
263 See id.
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exchange in Xi'an.2"' This exchange is designed to provide a
place where copyrights and other intellectual property can be
bought and sold legally.265 The exchange may assist China's
burgeoning market structures in the legal transfer of intellectual
property rights. Cai Cheng, vice chairman of the National
People's Congress Standing Committee, acknowledged that "as far
as the protection of intellectual property rights is concerned, it is
inadequate to rely [completely] on the state to exercise legislative,
judicial, and administrative protection . ... [I]t is necessary to
draw support from nongovernmental professional forces to
provide enterprises or individuals with special technical and legal
assistance.,,66
Finally, tighter border controls could significantly improve
Chinese copyright protections.267 This is because a vast portion
of infringing material is exported out of China for sale abroad,
thereby exponentially increasing the potential market for these
illegal goods. In 1994, in order to limit the export of pirated
goods, the Chinese government released two notices allowing
PRC customs officials to confiscate infringing goods and then to
give them to local industry and commerce administrations.268
These notices were not effective enough to satisfy U.S. officials
and thus one of the main elements of the Sino-U.S. Agreement
was improved customs enforcement.269 Pursuant to the Sino-
U.S. Agreement, for the period between March 1 and October 1,
1995, Chinese customs officials were ordered to intensify the
import/export border control for copyrighted material, including
compact discs and CD-ROMs. 0 Once infringing materials were
264 See Suzanne McElligott, A Better Mindset on Intellectual Property? Beijing
Moves to Curb Infringement, CHEMICAL WK., Supp. Aug. 30/Sept.6, 1995, at S7,
S8.
265 See id. at S8.
266 Aiping, supra note 14, at 36. In the same interview, Cai encouraged the
"all-round anT three-dimensional protection of intellectual property rights." Id.
267 See Talking in China, supra note 219.
161 See id. Typically, PRC customs officials did not have the authority to
confiscate infringing goods but instead would customarily return them to the
Chinese individual or company responsible. See Katherine C. Spelman,
Combatting Counterfeiting, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 1995:
MANAGEMENT AND PROTEcTION, 309 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 417, 1995).
269 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
270 See Sino-U.S. Agreement, supra note 233, 34 I.L.M. at 900.
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stopped at the border, they were to be "seized, forfeited and de-
stroyed[,] or excluded from the stream of commerce. "2l The
Sino-U.S. Agreement also called for the implementation of new
customs regulations, modelled after U.S. laws, to be published by
July 1, 1995, and made effective October 1, 1995.'
Despite these promises, the Chinese have yet to significantly
improve border control. Illegally pirated goods still easily flow
out of Chinese ports.23 Chinese customs regulations do not yet
meet the requirements of the Sino-U.S. Agreement, and contain
substantial loopholes?' 4 A customs recordation system has not
yet been established as required under the Sino-U.S. Agree-
ment. 5 One problem complicating enforcement is that several
agencies are responsible for controlling pirated goods in China,
unlike Hong Kong where one department does the job, thus
making coordination more difficult?' Problems in supervising
provincial government authorities also have made border control
difficult because they sometimes disregard orders from the
national government.'m These issues must be addressed in order
to successfully combat Chinese copyright pirates.
If all or even some of these extrajudicial factors are improved,
the Intellectual Property Courts would be much more effective
and might begin to have a real impact on the Chinese attitude
towards copyright infringement. If not, the Intellectual Property
Courts could be relegated to impotence and obscurity as intellectu-
al property owners either seek redress from other, potentially
more efficacious sources or settle for no relief at all.
271 Id.
272 See id.
' See, e.g., Pirated PC Software Said Flooding Out of China, REUTERS LTD.,
Nov. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
24 See Implementation of the U.S.-Cbina Intellectual Proper Rights
Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East Asian and Paciic Af airs of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of
Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
27 See id.
26 See Jonathan Hill, Mainland Told to Act on Piracy, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 17, 1995, at 3.
27 See id.
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6. CONCLUSION
Currently, copyright infringement in the PRC remains a
significant problem. As a result of Western pressure, however,
China has agreed to substantially increase its proactive efforts to
reduce piracy. Despite these efforts, Western firms must continu-
ally resort to the Chinese judicial system to protect their intellec-
tual property rights. Foreign entities such as Disney and the BSA
recently have experienced relative success navigating the Intellectu-
al Property Courts in order to protect their copyrights. Damage
awards are slowly increasing as more cases are adjudicated, which
may provide the incentive for more Western companies to sue for
copyright infringement.
More importantly, greater utilization of the Intellectual
Property Courts is a crucial element in the fight against Chinese
copyright pirates. These courts can help enforce copyrights and
educate the Chinese public regarding intellectual property issues,
thus providing a strong deterrent against future infringement.
Cutting through deeply ingrained Chinese notions that copying
is proper conduct and replacing such ideas with a more Western
view of copyright is fundamental to copyright protection in the
PRC. Without the stricter enforcement and increased awareness
with respect to intellectual property issues that Intellectual
Property Courts can help foster, Chinese and Western efforts to
improve copyright protection in China may be doomed to failure.
Expanded employment of the Intellectual Property Courts,
combined with stricter PRC government enforcement, more
zealous education on intellectual property issues, use of nongov-
ernmental professional groups, and escalated border control, most
likely will produce some reduction of Chinese copyright piracy,
although how much is still uncertain. As the PRC strives toward
a market economy and makes a genuine attempt to take its desired
place as an international trading power, significant progress in
copyright protection may yet occur in China as improvements are
made in judicial and extrajudicial copyright protection mecha-
nisms.
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